by
Chris Henry (ills. Brian Delf)
Osprey New Vanguard no. 98
reviewed by Ian Daglish
British Anti-tank Artillery 1939-45
by
Chris Henry (ills. Brian Delf)
Osprey New Vanguard no. 98
reviewed by Ian Daglish
A book telling the full story of the development and tactics of Second World War British antitank artillery is eagerly awaited. Sadly, this is not that book. Written by an author with professional qualifications as an artillery expert, this book does include many interesting facts about the subject. But a few obvious mistakes lead the reader to be circumspect about other details presented, and sure enough under scrutiny more errors emerge, of omission as well as commission.
Some points leap out on first reading. Page 3 surprisingly states that 'An anti-tank gun is a high-velocity weapon,' apparently excluding whole families of hollow-charge, HEAT, rocket-propelled, and other antitank weapons. Yet by page 5, the chemical energy warhead (necessarily low-velocity) is hailed as 'The saviour of the anti-tank principle'.
According to page 5, 'The story of British anti-tank weapons really begins with the 2-pdr gun.' The author is entitled to his opinion, but this reader wondered why other British antitank weapons, not least the Boys antitank rifle, might have been merited some consideration. Even if the 'Grenade, Hand, Anti-Tank No. 74' (alternatively known as the 'Sticky Bomb') or the 'Grenade, Hand or Projector, No. 76' (an improved Molotov Cocktail, one version of which could be fired from a Northover Projector) are not considered worthy candidates, surely the world's first hollow charge antitank projectile, the No. 68 Grenade which the BEF in France fired from the grenade discharger cup of the Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle, deserves a mention? And if not this, then its distant descendant the PIAT.
The author maintains that 'Between the wars Britain… agonized over the way to deal with the mechanised threat.' This is interesting. All the evidence this reviewer has seen supports an argument that, between the wars, most of the British Army was well content with its antitank capability. Writing in 1943, J R Lester ('Tank Warfare') records that during 1935 - 1939 'Many people thought that the progress in antitank defence had outstripped the improvement in tanks.' E W Sheppard ('Tanks in the Next War') believed that the use of tanks would be limited.
Nor can this reviewer accept that 'at the beginning of the war, the 2-pdr was already obsolete'. Pemberton's Official History of the artillery expresses pre-war satisfaction with the 2 pounder; and in 1940 'our anti-tank equipments and training may be said to have been vindicated... The 2-pdr. was a good gun and compared very favourably with its German equivalent.' (The German 3.7cm Pak 35/36.) Once equipped with solid shot instead of APHE (used by the earlier 3 pounder), the 2 pounder could defeat any 1940 German tank, until the advent of German face-hardened armour in turn defeated the AP round (and its APCBC, when that finally arrived).
An author who really should know better (or his publisher's editor?) repeatedly commits the minor but irritating mistake of giving the Loyd Carrier (and its eponymous designer) a second 'L'. Other terminology is questionable. Page 18 implies that only the '17/25-pdr was referred to as a "Pheasant",' whereas this term was commonly applied throughout the war to any towed 17 pounders (just as the term 'Firefly' was commonly applied to the M10 'Achilles' as well as to 17 pounder-armed Shermans). And with regard to the Achilles, the book implies that these 17-pounder M10s 'only saw service in the last year of the war.' This is most certainly not the case: a number of Royal Artillery antitank regiments exchanged their 3 inch Wolverines for 17 pounder Achilles in time for the 6th June, 1944.
Most of the value of this book lies in technical details of the weapons featured, including the theoretical drill of the gun crews. Conversely, its greatest weakness is its lack of information about how the weapons were actually used in the field. The short section covering 'Tactics' appears to draw on a small number of sources to reach some unsurprising conclusions: camouflaged gun emplacements and flank shots against enemy armour were advantageous.
Not touched upon are the differences between the tactics of the Royal Artillery A/Tk regiments and the A/Tk platoons organic to the infantry regiments; the differences between American 'tank destroyer' policy and the more passive British doctrine; the different roles of towed and self-propelled antitank troops; nor the frustration felt by RA antitank gunners (whether towed or 'sp') when placed 'under command' of infantry or armoured units whose commanders did not fully appreciate their function. Finally, as to the 'much photographic evidence' that 'guns were often placed on street corners', this comment ignores the fact that many staged photographs show guns on road surfaces from which they could not possibly have fired without catastrophic recoil effects (the trails not being 'dug in'). The paucity of photographs of properly emplaced guns is due to effective camouflage yielding unsatisfactory publicity photos.
In summary, this book is probably not for the general reader, who may form some misguided impressions. For the specialist, some technical points are of interest. Readers interested in the subject are recommended to seek a work not listed in the bibliography: A L Pemberton's 'The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment' (War Office, 1951)
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Ian Daglish is the author of "Operation GOODWOOD: the Great Tank Charge"
pub Pen & Sword 2004, ISBN 1 84415 030 5
British Anti-tank Artillery 1939-45
by
Chris Henry (ills. Brian Delf)
Osprey New Vanguard no. 98
ISBN 1 84176 638 0
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